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Multistate modelling extended by behavioural rules: An
application to migration
Anna Klabunde 1, Sabine Zinn 2, Frans Willekens 3 and
Matthias Leuchter1
1Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 2Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories, 3University of
Groningen and the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI)
We propose to extend demographic multistate models by adding a behavioural element: behavioural rules
explain intentions and thus transitions. Our framework is inspired by the Theory of Planned Behaviour.
We exemplify our approach with a model of migration from Senegal to France. Model parameters are
determined using empirical data where available. Parameters for which no empirical correspondence
exists are determined by calibration. Age- and period-specific migration rates are used for model
validation. Our approach adds to the toolkit of demographic projection by allowing for shocks and social
influence, which alter behaviour in non-linear ways, while sticking to the general framework of multistate
modelling. Our simulations yield that higher income growth in Senegal leads to higher emigration rates in
the medium term, while a decrease in fertility yields lower emigration rates.
Keywords: international migration; life course modelling; Theory of Planned Behaviour; multistate
modelling; microsimulation; agent-based modelling
Introduction
For policymakers and researchers alike, it is of para-
mount interest to be able to predict how people make
demographically relevant decisions. In this paper, we
present a novel approach to projection by incorpor-
ating decision-making and interaction between indi-
viduals in a demographic projection model. We use
an individual-based model rather than a popu-
lation-based model such as the popular cohort-com-
ponent model. For an overview of approaches to
forecasting migration, see Bijak (2011), as well as
other recent contributions from Hatton and William-
son (2011), Azose and Raftery (2013), and Abel and
Sander (2014). This individual-based micro perspec-
tive enables us to incorporate behavioural mechan-
isms and social processes that influence
demographic behaviour and population change into
our model. We can thus predict the effect of external
shocks, such as policy changes, by making the causal
mechanism through which shocks alter behaviour
explicit. Comparing model predictions with empirical
outcomes facilitates the subsequent drawing of con-
clusions on the plausibility of the assumed behaviour-
al mechanism. In this way, the model can be
improved gradually over time, by refining the par-
ameters and functional forms of its main component,
in this case the decision-making on international
migration.
In the model, as in real life, demographically rel-
evant decisions are embedded in the human life
course. Choices are motivated by aspirations and
preferences in different domains of life, such as
work and family, and constrained by available
resources (not only financial, but also cognitive and
social resources, and time). We take into consider-
ation that people do not have perfect foresight and
usually lack the time and cognitive abilities to
acquire the full and unbiased information necessary
to make a rational choice. Preferences vary over
the life course, as do both the availability of and
need for resources, because of events or changing
conditions (e.g., available social support). As a
result, the choices people make vary with stages of
life, and events that occur in one domain of life influ-
ence decisions in other domains of life.
Wemodel the human life course, which is operatio-
nalized as a sequence of states and transitions
between states. In this paper, five status variables
are considered: marital status, family status
Population Studies, 2017
Vol. 71, No. S1, S51–S67, https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2017.1350281
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
(number of children), employment status, place of
residence, and ‘living’ status (alive or dead). The
sequence of states occupied at each age and the
ages at which transitions occur depend on personal,
social, economic, and political factors as well as on
random factors. The sequences of states and
transitions are thus outcomes of a stochastic
process. The process used here, which is commonly
considered to describe life histories, is the continu-
ous-time Markov process and extensions of it. It is
governed by transition rates, which determine both
the waiting time to a transition and the state occupied
after the transition (destination state). The continu-
ous-time Markov process incorporates the theory of
competing risks, which determines the destination
state entered after leaving a given (origin) state.
For an explicit treatment of the theory of competing
risks in the context of multistate models, see Aalen
et al. (2008) and Beyersmann et al. (2012).
Transition rates, all of which are estimated from
actual data apart from the transition rates to
migration, may depend on the systematic factors
mentioned, and may vary by age and over time.
Our main data sources are censuses and surveys. To
represent the various influences on transition rates,
we consider transition rates as ‘properties of individ-
uals’ (see, e.g., Keyfitz and Caswell 2005, p. 511).
Population-level rates result from the combination
of individual rates and the stocks and flows of
individuals.
The innovation introduced in this paper is that be-
havioural mechanisms, which characterize agent-
based demographic models, are used in multistate
life course modelling. For an overview of other simu-
lation models of migration, see Klabunde and Wille-
kens (2016); other well-known agent-based models in
demography include Billari et al. (2007), Aparicio
Diaz et al. (2011), Fent et al. (2013), and Grow and
Van Bavel (2015).
To keep the model manageable and close to the
current state of the art in multistate life course mod-
elling, all transitions are governed by rates except
one: migration. We replace the migration rate with
a migration decision process. The decision to
migrate is endogenous: migration is embedded in
the life course. The predisposition of an individual
to migrate depends on their experiences in the
other domains of life, such as employment and
family. In addition, a person at risk of migration is
embedded in a transnational social network.
The life course has become a recognized frame-
work for the study of migration (e.g., Mulder 1993;
Kley 2011; Wingens et al. 2011) and the importance
of the social network has been established (see,
e.g., Munshi 2003; Epstein and Gang 2006; Haug
2008; Giulietti et al. 2013; and Baizan and Gonzá-
lez-Ferrer 2014 for migrants from Senegal). We
model the migration decision process as a multistage
(and multistate) process. The transition rates
between stages are determined by decision rules.
The time a decision takes is the combined duration
(waiting time) in each stage.
Individuals pursue happiness, which is assumed to
depend on two factors: income (which differs
between countries) and being close to family. For
an overview of theoretical models of migration in
economics, see, for example, Hagen-Zanker (2008)
or Borjas (2014). What matters are not only the indi-
vidual’s preferences but also the preferences and
opinions of others (social norms) and the individual’s
ability to mobilize the resources required to remove
barriers. Some barriers (e.g., increased border
control) and some opportunities are unforeseen but
influence the outcome of the decision process. The
impact of these unforeseen factors on migration
often depends on the stage of the decision process
in which they arise (Kley and Mulder 2010; Kley
2017). The explicit modelling of the decision
process offers an opportunity to distinguish different
types of uncertainties that enter the migration
decision at different stages and affect its outcome.
Several decision theories and theories of action are
available for use as a basis for the behavioural mech-
anism to replace the migration rate (Balke and
Gilbert 2014; Klabunde and Willekens 2016). Differ-
ent factors may influence the migration decision in
different ways according to the decision stage, for
example, immigration regulation may matter little
when forming the first intention to migrate, but
during travel preparation it can become a true
obstacle. Furthermore, re-evaluating one’s intention
to perform an action in light of new life circumstances
(e.g., becoming a parent) is very common for life-
altering decisions such as migration. Therefore, the
theory should be a process theory, in other words, a
theory that distinguishes stages in the process
leading to action. The theory should also allow for
an explicit decision not to migrate but to stay, as
argued by Coulter (2013). We use the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1991; Fishbein
and Ajzen 2010) because it is simple but still con-
siderably more realistic than the utility maximization
model. We adapt the TPB to turn it into a process
theory.
Model parameters are estimated from empirical
data on population, wealth, income, consumption,
marriage, fertility, migration, and mortality in
Senegal and France. Senegal is selected because it
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is one of the three African countries included in the
survey on ‘Migration between Africa and Europe’
(MAFE) (Beauchemin 2015). The survey was con-
ducted in 2008 in the Dakar region and was the
main data source for parameterizing the model.
Further data sources used are the Senegal Population
Census 1988, the Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) of Senegal, and World Population Prospects
(United Nations 2015). France is selected because it
is one of the three European countries in which
migrants from Senegal were interviewed in the
MAFE survey.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next
section, we describe our modelling approach. The
model parametrization is then presented to show its
application to migration from Senegal to France. In
the ‘Scenario-based projections’ section we demon-
strate how the model can be used for scenario analy-
sis. Finally, we present our discussion and conclusion.
Our approach: multistate modelling enriched
by behavioural mechanisms
The life course model
Our approach extends the demographic multistate
model by adding behavioural rules that determine
the probability of a transition. A detailed model
description is far too comprehensive for this paper.
To this end, we refer to Klabunde et al. (2015) and
the corresponding ‘openabm’ project (see https://
www.openabm.org/model/5146/version/6/view). In
the current paper, the details we focus on are the
interactions between the demographic multistate
model and the migration decision model, and the
role of the social network.
At each moment in time, individuals are at risk of
experiencing multiple (exclusive) transitions such as
death, marriage, childbirth, or migration. Such tran-
sitions are called competing risks. Since two tran-
sitions cannot occur at exactly the same time, the
occurrence of one transition hinders the occurrence
of another transition. Additionally, the occurrence
of one transition changes the probability of other
transitions at a later time.
Enriching the demographic multistate model with
a behavioural element enables us to determine life
course dynamics in a very specific and innovative
manner: the relevant event (i.e., migration) is an
outcome of a decision process, described by explicit
behavioural rules, and the multistate model defines
all circumstantial events (such as childbirth and mar-
riage). After the decision process has been
completed or interrupted, the multistate model
takes over to describe the life course further.
Our decision model is inspired by the TPB, which
states that intentions are the best predictors of be-
haviour. Intentions are determined by one’s beliefs
about: (a) the outcomes (benefits and costs) of the
behaviour or attitude; (b) social norms; and (c)
one’s own ability to mobilize resources, take advan-
tage of opportunities, and remove barriers (per-
ceived and actual behavioural control). Background
factors influence the beliefs that are formed.
Figure 1 is a schematic presentation of the TPB
applied to migration. The three rows in the middle
show the individual beliefs (a), (b), and (c). There
are several reasons for choosing the TPB: first, it is
an established theory from social psychology (for a
review of applications, see Armitage and Conner
2001) and is often applied to explain and predict
demographic behaviour (e.g., Ajzen and Klobas
2013; Philipov et al. 2015), including migration (e.g.,
de Jong 2000). Second, the TPB offers a behavioural
heuristic, which is apt for deliberate decisions that
involve high levels of uncertainty, such as the
migration decision. Third, it is possible to extend
the TPB in such a way that attrition during the
decision process can be modelled. Thus, we can
account for interfering events, either in the form of
competing risks (such as marriage or childbirth) or
in the form of external events that change an individ-
ual’s environment (such as a change in immigration
law). Fourth, factors with a clearly defined interpret-
ation can be included in the model as influencing atti-
tudes, beliefs, norms, or perceived behavioural
control.
Far-reaching decisions involving uncertainty take
time: individuals need time to gather information
about possible consequences of the decision, to
evaluate positive and negative aspects, and to
consult significant others. Very practical matters,
such as applying for a visa or saving money, also
take time. To capture this temporal aspect, we
suggest describing decision-making as a continuous
process. The basic assumption of our process model
is that an individual makes a decision in three
stages: first, they determine their attitude, social
norms, and perceived behavioural control associated
with a certain behaviour and form a behavioural
intention. Whether an intention translates into an
event is determined by the actual level of control
over an action. Between the formation of an inten-
tion and the actual event (migration), a planning
phase and a preparation phase occur, as shown in
Figure 2. Individuals can leave the decision process
at any stage and at any point in time.
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Between first forming an intention and eventually
migrating, the circumstances of a person’s life can
change drastically. This can happen either through
the behaviour of other individuals—parents, spouse,
employer—or because the individual’s preferences
or priorities change. For instance, the birth of a
child or a job offer may change the desire to emi-
grate. Drastic external shocks such as an economic
crisis can also change an individual’s environment
and impact on the decision to emigrate. Such
shocks interfere during the period between an
already formed intention and the actual behaviour
and can cause an individual to give up an intention.
In fact, while 14 per cent of the world’s adults
express a desire to emigrate, only 8 per cent of
those who desire it are already planning to do so,
and of those planning, only 39 per cent have started
making preparations, which is only 0.5 per cent of
the total (Esipova et al. 2011). The more hesitantly
an individual approaches the execution of a plan,
the more time passes since the first intention was
formed and, with the passage of time, it becomes
more likely that an interfering event occurs.
In summary, our approach is composed of two
model components: a multistate model and a
decision model, with the latter embedded into the
first. First, we briefly describe the demographic
multistate model. The decision model is presented
next. In the multistate model, states are denoted
by sj. In the decision model, we use σj to denote
the states.
Multistate model. Consider an individual in state sj
and the transition to state sk. The rate of transition,
which describes the propensity of an individual in sj
to experience the transition to sk, is assumed to
depend on time t (age) and the time wsj already
spent in sj, and may also depend on background









































Figure 1 Schematic representation of the migration decision model, inspired by the representation of the TPB
by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010)
Source: Inspired by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 22).
Figure 2 The migration decision model is made up of three stages
Source: Authors’ own work.
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state sj at t + wsj depends on all competing risks:











wherewsj , sk is the waiting time in sj until moving on to
the next state sk, lsj ,sk are the corresponding tran-
sition rates, and K is the number of all possible
next destination states, except the current state (com-
peting risks). Assuming constant transition rates over
fixed time intervals (e.g., years) causes piecewise
exponential waiting time distributions, and eases
the computation of further process implications.
This representation implies stochastic independence
of the waiting times corresponding to the distinct
competing risks.
Decision model. In our application, migration is the
relevant event whose decision-making process is
described explicitly. At a certain age, each young
individual forms an intention towards migration for
the first time; this may be positive (inclination to
migrate) or negative (inclination to stay). The age
can be fixed in the model (e.g., at age 18) or can be
a random variable with a given probability distri-
bution. Following the argument in Billari (2000), we
assume heterogeneous starting ages that follow a
normal distribution. The intention of an individual
to migrate, I(t), hinges on their attitude A(t), the
social norms SN(t), and the perceived behavioural
control PBC(t), each depending on time t (α, β, and
γ constitute weighting parameters set through cali-
bration):
I(t) = aA(t)+ bSN(t)+ gPBC(t) (2)
with A(t), SN(t) > 0, PBC(t) < 0, and −∞ < I(t) <∞.
In the model, attitude towards migration is influ-
enced by the probability of earning a higher income
in the host country and by the number of family
members that have already migrated. Social norms
are determined by the number of other migrants
someone knows. Perceived behavioural control is
negative here because we only consider impeding,
not enabling, factors, namely, migration cost and
border control. The higher they are, the lower per-
ceived behavioural control an individual has over
migration, and the lower the intention.
A negative intention value causes an individual to
drop out of the decision process and not to re-enter it
again. A positive value means that the individual
forms an intention towards migration and moves to
stage 1, the intention phase. Then the individual
might move on to the planning phase (stage 2) and
thereafter to the preparation stage before migration
(stage 3). The transition rates lsish(t) of passing
at time t from one stage i to the next stage h (i.e.,
from stage 1 to stage 2, from stage 2 to stage 3, and
from stage 3 to migration) are defined as follows:
lsish(t) = r exp (I(t)) (3)
where ρ is the baseline rate. When the intention is
negative, an individual is assumed to leave the
decision process. If the intention is positive, then
the waiting time function S(wsish , t) of moving
from stage i to stage h can be derived by








After the waiting time in a stage has expired, the indi-
vidual experiences the passage from one stage of the
decision process to the next one. Thus, our decision
model defines the waiting time from intention for-
mation to migration by a convolution of three
waiting time distributions corresponding to stages
1–3 of decision-making.
On expiry of the final stage (preparation; stage 3),
the success of migration depends on two further con-
straints: (1) whether household capital exceeds the
costs of migration, taking into consideration any chil-
dren the migrant may have to take along; and (2)
whether the individual manages to cross the border.
This last impediment hinges on the value pb(t) > 0,
actual border control, which is assumed to be
exogenous. The success probability π(t) is defined as
p(t) = (2.5+ exp (− pb(t)−1))−1.
This yields an average of only three out of ten
persons who try to cross the border being successful.
The MAFE contains a question about unsuccessful
migration attempts. González-Ferrer et al. (2012)
have evaluated that question and derived age-,
period-, and country-specific migration success
rates. They computed the rates by dividing the cumu-
lated number of failed migration attempts (x) by the
cumulated number of successful entries (y). Trans-
forming the average success probability that we use
in our model, 3/10 = y/(x + y), into this format yields
an average rate of x/y = 7/3 = 2.3, which matches the
figures derived by González-Ferrer et al. Entering a
new stage in the migration decision process and
experiencing a new demographic event (such as mar-
riage) are competing risks. In other words, once the
demographics of an individual vary, the value of the
waiting time function in the respective stage of the
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decision process might also change. Therefore, a new
intention value and a new waiting time are computed
after every demographic event, as shown in Figure 3.
Here, a married and childless individual in the plan-
ning stage experiences the transition to the prep-
aration stage as the next event (the waiting time
corresponding to the preparation stage is shorter
than the waiting time to death or to having a child).
Thereafter, the individual has a child, since the corre-
sponding waiting time is now the shortest. As the
demographics of the individual change with this tran-
sition (i.e., the individual is no longer childless), they
are assigned a new intention value and new waiting
times are computed for all competing risks (i.e.,
migrating and dying). In this example, this yields a
shorter waiting time to death than before, shorter
than the one to migration. Consequently, as the
next event the individual dies. For a more detailed
description of the decision model of migration, see
Klabunde et al. (2015) and Warnke et al. (2017).
While the emigration decision process and conse-
quently the propensity to emigrate are affected by
transitions in other domains of life, transitions in
these other domains are not affected by the
migration decision stage. For instance, an individual
who is planning to emigrate has the same rate of mar-
riage or childbirth as an individual who is not. In
principle, our approach can handle mutual depen-
dencies, but they are omitted because of a lack of
adequate data that would allow for plausible hypoth-
eses on how cognitive processes in the migration
domain could affect other behaviour, for example,
in the fertility domain.
The simulation
Based on this transition model, individual life courses
can be simulated. To simulate a population evolving
over time, the population needs to be initialized
and life courses need to be created for each individ-
ual. In addition, newborns are added to the popu-
lation over time and individuals leave through
death. For this purpose, the waiting time function
(equation (1)) is decomposed into a set of indepen-
dent waiting time functions, one for each possible
destination state. These different waiting time func-
tions and the waiting time function of the decision
stage currently being processed (e.g., waiting time
function for stage 1 or stage 3) are linked by the
event that occurs first and censors all other events.
This event might be a demographic event or the tran-
sition to the next stage of the decision process. To
determine the next event, we compute random
waiting times for all possible destination states and
the next stage of the decision process. The shortest
waiting time is the one to be realized and indicates
the next event to happen. The waiting time in one
state until moving to another state can be simulated
by the inversion theorem (Rubinstein and Kroese
2008, pp. 51ff.). According to this theorem, a
random waiting time w from the correct distribution
results from






Figure 3 Illustration of the competing risks framework: extract of an example life course
Source: Authors’ own work.
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where λ(t) denotes the respective transition rates
and u is a standard uniform distributed random
number (and for the sake of clarity, without loss of
generality, all indices referring to either states or
stages are omitted from here onwards). The compu-
tation of the waiting time function (equation (4))
requires an evaluation of the intention function
(equation (2)). Individuals with negative intention
values never make a transition to the planning
stage; they exit the decision process and thus stay
in the first stage for an infinitely long waiting time.
Let w* be the shortest of the waiting times simulated.
Then, the individual under consideration experi-
ences the event corresponding to that waiting time
at time t +w*. For each individual in the virtual
population, this computation of the shortest waiting
time, and (if necessary) re-evaluation of intentions,
is repeated until either the individual leaves the
virtual population by dying or the simulation stop
time is reached.
The migration decision model and the overall
setting are implemented using NetLogo (Wilensky
1999)with the continuous-time extension by Sheppard
and Railsback (2015). The demographic events are
simulated using the R package MicSim (Zinn 2014).
Connection between NetLogo and R is through a
NetLogo extension (Thiele and Grimm 2010).
Application: migration from Senegal to
Europe
To illustrate the capability and potential of our
model, it is applied to migration from the Dakar
region in Senegal to France between 1982 and
2050. The parameters of the model, including most
of those in the decision model, are estimated from
empirical data. The main data source is the MAFE
survey (Beauchemin 2012), conducted in 2008. This
includes both a household and an individual bio-
graphic (retrospective) sample survey of Senegalese
natives residing in the Dakar region and a sample
of Senegalese migrants currently residing in France,
Spain, or Italy (Beauchemin 2012). These data
provide a unique opportunity to follow Senegalese
migrants and non-migrants for an accurate esti-
mation of transition rates for demographic events,
as they include complete histories of births, unions,
migrations, migration attempts, and employment for
every respondent. Additional data sources include
the Population Census of Senegal and the DHS.
In the model, individuals are connected with
others in households, families, and social networks.
Income is shared within households; a part of joint
household income is consumed, and the remainder,
if any, is saved and added to household capital. The
migration cost is covered from household capital.
Network members in the destination country
provide information on wages in that country and
are the source of social norms on migration.
The application of the model to the population of
the Dakar region requires the determination of
rates of marriage and marriage dissolution, parity-
specific fertility rates, mortality rates, rates of
labour market entry and exit, and decision rules
that govern the transition between the stages in the
emigration decision. The demographic data need to
be age specific. In addition, network and marriage
market rules have to be defined. Finally, income dis-
tributions as well as initial household wealth have to
be determined. For sake of simplicity and because of
data limitations, we use data from France to rep-
resent the host country, as France is traditionally by
far the most important country of emigration for
Senegalese (Sakho et al. 2013). Because of the lack
of comparable wage data in the MAFE data set—
there are 36 per cent missing values in the biographic
data set—we use empirical time series of gross dom-
estic product (GDP, expressed as purchasing power
parity (PPP) per capita), taken from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/
external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28), and consumption data
from the World Development Indicators (http://
databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=
2&country=SEN&series=&period=#). For estimat-
ing initial wealth in Senegal in 1982, we rely on
Davies et al. (2009, 2011). For the distributions of
income and wealth we use log-normal distributions.
Initial values of wealth and income are assigned ran-
domly to individuals.
In the corresponding ‘openabm’ project, we list all
the data sources and the estimation methods used to
obtain the model parameters and specifications of
our application. In the current paper, we focus on
how we determine the initial population, the rates
of transition in the life course, the marriage market,
and the social network.
Initial population and estimation of transition
rates
We obtain an initial population of 2,000 individuals in
the Dakar region in 1982 by drawing a random
sample of the population from the 1988 Census in
Senegal calibrated to population marginals of 1982.
Selected individuals who are married are matched
with a partner in the virtual population. The
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matching procedure is described in the next subsec-
tion. If they have children in the Census data, they
have the same number of children in the virtual
population.
Age- and period-specific mortality rates are taken
from the World Population Prospects (United
Nations 2015). These data comprise mortality prob-
abilities for Senegal and France for all years from
1980 to 2050, grouped into five-year age intervals.
Senegalese migrants living in France are assumed
to have the same mortality as French citizens. From
these data, mortality probabilities (qx) for single
ages (x) are computed using the Heligman–Pollard
model (Pollard 1973; Kostaki 1991; Ibrahim 2008).
The DHS of Senegal is used to estimate age-
specific marriage and fertility rates for people resid-
ing in Senegal. Rates for migrants are estimated
using the MAFE household data set, to account
for the fact that the transition rates of migrants in
the destination country differ from the rates of the
stayers. A two-step procedure is used to determine
the rates. First, single-year-of-age and (decennial)
cohort-specific occurrence-exposure rates are esti-
mated. Because of the limited number of cases, the
single-year-of-age transition rates for the migrants
are assumed to be time constant. In the second
step, these rates are used to fit two types of para-
metric models to derive smooth age profiles: the
Hadwiger model is used to fit fertility rates and
the Coale–McNeil model to fit marriage rates (Had-
wiger 1940; Gilje 1969; Coale and McNeil 1972;
Chandola et al. 1999). Age-specific rates are esti-
mated for all years from 1982 to 2014. For the
sake of simplicity, fertility and marriage rates for
2015–50 are assumed to be equal to the age-specific
rates in 2014.
Marriage market
At the beginning of the simulation, all individuals are
unlinked. To create households, couples have to be
formed. For this purpose, an initial marriage
market is established, similar to the one described
in Zinn (2012). All individuals in the initial popu-
lation who are married in the empirical sample
enter this market and search for an appropriate
spouse. To create matches, we use the empirical prob-
ability that two individuals are married, considering
the age of the man and the age difference between
husband and wife. The model is estimated using
Senegalese couple data for 1986–2014 from the
DHS. In the market, all individuals are queued
according to their age. The youngest individual is
the head of the queue and the oldest individual con-
stitutes the tail. Starting with the head of the queue,
each individual inspects all other opposite-sex
members of the market and selects the one with the
highest empirical probability of forming a couple
with that individual. A Bernoulli trial with the
success probability being the matching probability
decides whether the match takes place. After the
whole queue has been passed through, some individ-
uals might still be unpaired. These individuals are
now stepwise linked to those market members with
the highest matching probability. By design, this mar-
riage algorithm does not preserve the estimated
matching probabilities with regard to the compo-
sition of the pool of available candidates. However,
we seek to form couples whose joint characteristics
resemble observed couple characteristics. For this
purpose, our approach is suitable. For a detailed dis-
cussion on this topic and for a comparison of simu-
lated vs. observed couple characteristics, see Zinn
(2012).
Once the initialization phase is complete and the
run starts, the timing of marriage formation is deter-
mined by individual waiting times to marriage, which
are derived from the age-specific marriage rates. An
individual enters the market six months before a mar-
riage event is scheduled, or immediately, if the time
to the marriage event is shorter. Whether a man
and woman form a couple depends on two factors
(see Zinn 2012). First, in continuous-time simulations
like ours, the probability that two individuals experi-
ence events separately at the same time is zero.
Nonetheless, to enable individuals to marry at one
specific point in time, each individual scheduled to
marry is assigned a so-called marriage interval of
one year. If the marriage intervals of two individuals
overlap, they are considered as potential partners. If
the couple gets married, the simulated marriage time
is the mean of the two individually scheduled mar-
riage times. Second, two potential partners have to
be compatible, quantified by the probability that
two individuals are married in the empirical data. A
logit model is used to predict that probability, with
the age difference of two potential spouses used as
the explanatory variable. At the moment an individ-
ual enters the market, they choose the one with the
highest matching probability among all opposite-sex
members with overlapping marriage intervals. A Ber-
noulli trial decides on the success of a match. Newly
formed couples leave the market. Individuals who
are not able to find an appropriate partner in time
(i.e., by six months after the scheduled marriage
time) are matched according to the highest matching
probabilities.
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The role of the social network: family and
significant others
In our model, a married couple forms a household,
while newborns join the household and remain in
the household until they get married themselves.
Families and households are crucial when calculating
the attitude towards migration. A positive attitude
towards migration is most prevalent when the pro-
spect of higher earnings seems very attractive and
when migration implies reuniting with family
members who migrated previously.
One aspect of the attitude towards migration is the
evaluation of an expected higher income in the host
country, yi,t (see equation (2)). It is higher, the
poorer a person’s household in Senegal is, in other
words, the lower the household capital per household
member is:
yi,t = 1, 000− j ch,tAh,t
( )
(6)
where ch,t is the capital of the household h of the
(adult) household member i at time t, Ah,t is the
number of individuals in the household, and j is a
weighting parameter. We do not compare expected
income (a flow concept) to household capital (a
stock concept); rather, household capital measures
the necessity of considering migration at all; it is a
measure of poverty. The impact of a person’s own
income is considered when determining the prob-
ability that income will be increased through
migration, see later. If the household capital is zero,
the expected higher income in the host country is
given the value of 1,000. Given that we use GDP
(PPP per capita) as a proxy for the average wage,
the evaluation of higher income in the host country
is almost always positive with this parameterization.
Thus, the evaluation of an increase in earnings
tends to be larger when there are many children in
the household. On the other hand, more children
lead to lower household capital and thus an individ-
ual has lower perceived behavioural control over
their ability to afford the migration cost. Which of
these two effects prevails depends on the relative
sizes of the parameters of attitude and perceived be-
havioural control, whose sizes are themselves deter-
mined by calibration (see next subsection). The
attitude towards migration also depends on the pro-
spect of family reunification through migration. In
the model, the more family members (grandparents,
parents, siblings, spouse, children) that have
migrated, the stronger the attitude in favour of
migration.
Individuals are connected through network links.
At the beginning of an individual’s life, they form
links to their parents and older siblings (no matter
where these relatives live) and to all other
members of the household. In our implementation,
households are arranged on a torus-shaped grid;
space is interpreted to be purely social so that house-
holds that are spatially close are socially close (e.g.,
through shared ethnicity, religion, or origin). Individ-
uals also form links to all other individuals on the
eight patches surrounding them (Moore neighbour-
hood), independent of household membership.
Those network links remain throughout life.
Additionally, new links are formed when individuals
move to a new household, such as through marriage.
As long as migrants migrate alone, they remain part
of their home country household. Only if other
family members join them, is a new household
formed in the host country.
In our model, network links have a threefold func-
tion. First, they serve to transmit information: when
individuals compute the subjective probability of
increasing their income through migration, which
forms part of the attitude calculation, they proceed
as follows. For each of the individual’s network
neighbours in the host country, the income after
migration is compared with the individual’s own
income. The subjective probability of increasing
one’s income through migration is then the pro-
portion of the individual’s network neighbours in
the host country who have a higher income than
the individual’s income. Thus, the lower a person’s
own income, the higher the probability of increasing
expected income through migration. So, both the
level of poverty, as measured by household capital,
and the person’s own income flow have an impact
on the probability of migration.
Second, the subjective probability that border
enforcement will hinder the individual’s migration
is defined to be the proportion of migration
attempts of the individual’s network neighbours
that failed. Third, the network transmits social
norms regarding migration: in our interpretation of
the TPB, the ‘social norms’ component is defined
as the proportion of network neighbours who are
migrants.
Sensitivity analysis, calibration, and validation
Our model has six parameters that are free and can
be used for calibration (see Table 1): two of these
parameters (j and z) are part of the equation to
compute individual attitude values (see Klabunde
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et al. 2015), three of the free parameters (a, b, and
g) are components of the intention function
(equation (2)), and one parameter (r) is part of the
transition rates function (equation (3)). All remain-
ing quantities can be determined based on empirical
data (e.g., the Senegal census or the MAFE data). To
explore the impact of the six free parameters on the
model output, we could try to run the model with all
possible parameter configurations on a six-dimen-
sional fine-meshed grid. However, bearing in mind
that a model instance with a starting population of
2,000 individuals running over 80 years takes
approximately eight hours to run on a standard
desktop machine, such an approach would take
much too long. A feasible alternative is the definition
of a metamodel serving as a surrogate for the simu-
lation model. Such a metamodel is denoted as an
emulator (Sacks et al. 1989) and can be used for sen-
sitivity analysis and calibration. The idea is to
perform simulation runs for a feasible set of input
values (‘design points’) and to specify (‘train’) the
emulator by means of the corresponding input and
output values. Then, for any parameter configuration
not part of the original input ensemble, the emulator
provides a probability distribution of the potential
model outcome. A simplifying and reasonable
assumption in this direction is that the model
outcome follows a multivariate normal distribution
resulting in a Gaussian process emulator (Kennedy
and O’Hagan 2001; Oakley and O’Hagan 2002). To
explore the sensitivity of the migration model to
changes in the free parameters, we define a
summary of 729 design points (36), that is, three
values for each of the free parameters (see
Table 1). Then, a simulation run for each of the 729
configurations is performed holding the remaining
parameters fixed. To train the emulator, we regress
the total number of simulated migrations on the six
free parameters. Several interaction terms between
the free parameters turn out to be insignificant, so
we omit them in the final version. For estimation,
we rely on the software of Hankin (2012). The esti-
mated coefficients and 95 per cent confidence inter-
vals are given in the last column of Table 1.
We find that apart from r (the baseline hazard)
and z (the weighting parameter for family reunifica-
tion), all other parameters have a significant impact
on the number of simulated migrations. All in all, a
10 per cent increase in α or β, measured on the
basis of its largest design point component (i.e., an
increase of 0.0002 in α or an increase of 100 in β),
leads to average increases of 13.66 or 15.00 per
cent, respectively, in the expected number of simu-
lated migrants. In contrast, a 10 per cent increase in
γ or j (i.e., an increase of 0.0001 in γ or an increase
of 0.05 in j) leads to average decreases of 29.44 or
29.20 per cent, respectively, in simulated migrants.
Similarly, Beine et al. (2015) find that while networks
increase migration, family reunification is not the
main driver and only accounts for one-quarter of
the overall effect. The weighting parameter of house-
hold capital in the evaluation of higher income (j)
and the weighting parameter (g) of the perceived be-
haviour control component in the intention equation
show the strongest impacts. The importance of per-
ceived behavioural control on intention to migrate
is confirmed by van Dalen et al. (2005), who find
that a lack of means and legal problems with emigra-
tion are among the most important reasons given for
not intending to migrate. The effect of self-efficacy on
Table 1 Free model parameters, design points, and the relative contributions of the free parameters to the number of
migrants that the simulation is expected to generate at the design points
Free
parameter Type Design points
Relative contribution (95 per cent
confidence intervals)





b Weighting parameter of subjective norm
component in intention equation
{50, 100, 1,000} 47.59 (15.07, 80.11)
g Weighting parameter of perceived behaviour




j Weighting parameter of household capital in
evaluation of higher income in host country
{0.05, 0.1, 0.5} −92.68 (−125.99, −59.37)
z Weighting parameter in evaluation term for
family reunification
{1, 10, 100} −2.11 (−37.57, 33.35)
r Baseline hazard of decision process model {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} 12.67 (−9.07, 34.40)
Note: For parameter combinations that have not been observed, the coefficients only describe relative contributions approximately, since
here the distance to the design points and the variation in the output pattern must also be considered.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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intention to migrate is significant for their Senegalese
sample.
For calibration, we search a parameter combi-
nation that, if possible, minimizes both: (1) the
mean squared error (MSE) of the simulated
migration age profile and the migration age profile
given in the MAFE data (Beauchemin 2015); and
(2) the MSE of the simulated and observed
(period-specific) proportions of female migrants
among all migrants in 1982–89, 1990–98, and 1999–
2006, taken from the French 2011 Census. One
might expect that distinct minima exist for the two
criteria. However, in our case the objective function
has one unique minimum for both kinds of MSE con-
sidered (see Figure 4), yielding an optimal parameter
combination at α = 0.002, β = 50, γ = 0.0001, j = 0.05,
z = 10, ρ = 0.05, as shown by the black dot in
Figure 4. Figure 5 shows the results of the calibration.
Given that we fix certain parameters, the free par-
ameters are set to their optimal values. Of course,
there is some degree of arbitrariness to the fact that
we fix some parameters and not others. We make
this choice based on whether or not we can identify
an empirical correspondence for a parameter.
Clearly, if we were to fix other parameters, then the
optimal values of the remaining free parameters
would most likely be different. In this sense, we
face an identification problem. There are agent-
based models whose main purpose is to identify the
‘true’ value of a real-world quantity or parameter
that is immeasurable or uncertain, such as Alfarano
et al. (2005) or Heard (2014); for an overview of stat-
istical identification in agent-based modelling,
especially using emulators, see also Hilton and
Bijak (2017). We, on the other hand, do not claim
to have identified the one ‘true’ value of the par-
ameters, but just a meaningful model parametriza-
tion so that the model outcome resembles real-
world phenomena.
The success of this exercise is checked by comparing
the simulation output of the calibrated model with
external data that have not been used so far. Concre-
tely, we contrast the emigration rates (computed as
occurrence-exposure rates) derived from the simu-
lation with the emigration rates computed from the
MAFE survey. The results are depicted in Figure 6.
We find that the simulation model is capable of very
closely mimicking the migration situation in Senegal’s
Dakar region in the years 1984–2008.
Scenario-based projections. Once the model is cali-
brated and validated, it is possible to run it under
different future scenarios. We choose three different
scenarios: two based on individual income growth in
Senegal and one based on a different fertility rate. In
the baseline scenario, real income is assumed to con-
tinue growing at the 2015 rate (Senegal: 2.4 per cent,
France: 0.5 per cent) from 2015 to 2050. In scenarios
A1 and A2, we assume that real income in Senegal
starts to increase by 3 or 8 per cent per annum,
respectively, while real income continues to grow
Figure 4 Objective function used for calibration with minimum mean squared errors (MSE) of zero for the
proportion of female migrants and for the migration age profile at parameter combination α = 0.002, β = 50, γ
= 0.0001, j = 0.05, z = 10, ρ = 0.05 (corresponds to index 0 in the figure marked by a black dot)
Source: Authors’ calculations from simulation, MAFE data, French 2011 Census, and DHS.
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by 0.5 per cent in France. The results for the different
income scenarios are depicted in Figure 7.
What we see is that in the baseline and A1 scen-
arios the migration rate (number of migrations over
total number of persons at risk) starts to fall in
2015. In contrast, it stays relatively stable in the A2
scenario from 2015 to 2025. Then, it increases slightly
until 2033 before falling. The result that an 8 per cent
increase in income in the origin country yields a
larger migration rate might seem counter-intuitive
at first. The reason for this is that there are two
effects of a higher income in Senegal, which counter-
balance one another. One is that leaving becomes
less attractive (see equation (6)) because a higher
income in the host country is not valued as highly
any more. On the other hand, more people can sud-
denly afford to migrate: perceived behavioural
control as well as actual behavioural control is
increased strongly. In our parameterization, both
effects are roughly the same size, so that the overall
effect of the income increase is minor. After all,
even after 35 years of much larger income growth
(a) (b)
Figure 5 Observed figures and calibrated model outcome (dark grey: observed, light grey: simulated): (a) pro-
portion of female migrants among all migrants and (b) migration age profile (light grey bars: histogram of simu-
lated migration ages)
Source: As for Figure 4.
(a) (b)
Figure 6 Observed emigration rates (in dark grey with 95 per cent confidence intervals) from Senegal to
France estimated from the MAFE survey contrasted with simulated emigration rates (light grey dots) averaged
over ten simulation runs: (a) age-specific rates for the period 1984–2008 and (b) period-specific emigration rates
for the age range 18–39
Source: As for Figure 4.
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in Senegal than in France (8 per cent vs. 0.5 per cent),
average predicted income in France in 2050 is, at
2,884 euros (PPP), still larger than in Senegal at
2,046 euros. Thus, migration continues to remain
attractive for some, especially for the poorer Senega-
lese strata who can now afford it. Given that the level
of inequality in Senegal (Gini coefficient of 0.4) is
larger than in Southern Europe (Gini of 0.3), a con-
siderable number of people will remain poor. The
derivation of the Gini coefficient is given in the sup-
plementary material to this paper available at the
related ‘openabm’ project. This result is in line with
Clemens (2014) who finds that increases in annual
GDP per head of up to US$9,000 increase emigra-
tion; see also Faini and Venturini (1993), de Haas
(2010), and Westmore (2014). The overall decline
in relative migration frequencies (in all scenarios) is
mainly driven by an increase in population size,
itself driven by fertility constantly above replacement
level; thus, our findings are not at odds with studies
that predict an increase in absolute migration from
sub-Saharan Africa, such as Hatton and Williamson
(2011). In fact, immigration from Senegal to France
as well as to the EU28 as a whole has been remark-
ably stable in absolute numbers since 2008 (Eurostat
2016), despite strong population growth; our results
are very consistent with this.
In our baseline scenario, we assume constant ferti-
lity for all cohorts born after 1990, in line with recent
findings by Bongaarts (2016). In our fertility scenario
B, we instead assume that the decreasing linear trend
in fertility, which we observe until 2005, continues
until the 2030 birth cohort and then stabilizes. This
is in line with the projections by the United Nations
(2015).
We find that a stronger decrease in fertility leads to
a lower proportion of people migrating, until
approximately 2045 (Figure 8). Thereafter, the pro-
portion of people migrating remains stable and thus
surpasses that of the constant fertility scenario. This
pattern results from there being fewer people per
household, so household capital per household
member is larger, making migration less attractive.
This effect is counteracted by higher perceived and
actual behavioural control because there is less com-
petition, for example, with siblings, for household
capital. This leads to more individuals migrating
after planning and preparation have been completed.
To explain the negative overall effect on migration,
one should remember that the peak of migration
happens at around age 25 in the sample. Thus, a
higher mean age at first birth than in the baseline
scenario (around age 23), as assumed in the decreas-
ing fertility scenario, is associated with stronger com-
petition between migrating and having children,
leading to lower migration. After 2045, the cohorts
born from 2031 onwards become fertile and their fer-
tility rate is assumed not to decline further. Thus,
starting from this time the proportion of migrants
stays stable, in contrast to the baseline scenario. In
the literature, high fertility and high population
growth are usually associated with an increase in
migration, both theoretically and empirically,
mostly because of stronger competition for resources
Figure 7 Relative frequencies (migrations over total number of individuals) per year for income scenarios A1
(Senegal real income growth 3 per cent per annum) and A2 (8 per cent) vs. baseline (2.4 per cent); dotted lines
show 95 per cent confidence intervals
Source: Authors’ simulations.
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and jobs (Ravenstein 1885; Hugo 2011; Reher 2011)
and because sustained high fertility implies a high
proportion of young people more prone to migration
(Mayda 2010), so our result is in line with the
literature.
Summary and conclusion
We use a multistate model to simulate individual life
histories, considering five domains of life represented
by status variables: marital status, family status
(number of children), employment status, place of
residence (Senegal, France), and living status (alive
or dead). Transitions are governed by transition
rates, except for migration, which is the outcome of
a multistage decision process. The decision model is
inspired by the TPB. External shocks, such as policy
change, affect the decision process and hence the like-
lihood of migration. Taking into account decision-
making in the individual life course and the life
course in a multilevel environment (household, com-
munity, country, and transnational relations) has
great potential to improve the prediction of migration
beyond existing approaches based on empirical regu-
larities, time series models, and regression models.
We demonstrate an application to two income
scenarios and one fertility scenario. We find that
migration rates, at least during our simulation
horizon until 2050, are highest when growth in
Senegal is high. Higher fertility also implies more
migration. Many different applications are possible
within the model framework we introduce in this
paper; for example, relating to a weakening of ties
to other migrants over time, or to an introduction
of polygamous marriages, or to changes in the
labour market in either the home or host country.
The effect of these external changes on migration be-
haviour is always through a well-defined behavioural
channel. Verifying the results of model predictions
with empirical data allows us to draw conclusions as
to whether the suggested behavioural channel is
reasonable or not. If predictions turn out to be at
odds with empirical reality, the model can help to
identify alternative causal mechanisms that could
explain observed patterns.
For the approach to live up to its potential, we need
to deal with three challenges. The first challenge is to
determine which transitions in the life course can be
generated by transition rates and which should be
approached as outcomes of decision processes. Any
event in the life course potentially affects other
domains of life, hencemodelling calls for the selection
of key dependencies. The second challenge is to
account for the different types of uncertainty, includ-
ing the uncertainties in the model specification and
Figure 8 Relative frequencies (migrations over total number of individuals) per year for fertility scenario B
(decreasing fertility continues until 2030) vs. baseline; dotted lines show 95 per cent confidence intervals
Source: As for Figure 7.
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input parameter values. Our viewpoint of empirically
determining all measurable parameters and calibrat-
ing themodel by choosing the non-measurable behav-
ioural parameters, completed by a thorough
sensitivity analysis, is certainly not the only option.
It is advocated by Cirillo and Gallegati (2012) but cri-
ticized byGrazzini andRichiardi (2015), who argue in
favour of estimating all parameters through simu-
lation. Yet another viewpoint is that of estimating
the parameters in a Bayesian way, making use of all
available qualitative and quantitative information to
go from distributions of input values and arrive at dis-
tributions of output values (Poole and Raftery 2000;
Bijak et al. 2013). A third challenge is to obtain
better individual data on attitudes, norms, resources,
intentions, and behavioural outcomes, as well as
data on relevant social networks and the support
received. This calls for longitudinal surveys. There
are a few promising examples of excellent surveys
(see, e.g., the REPRO project, Philipov et al. 2015)
which, we hope, could inspire further initiatives in
gathering extremely useful data such as these.
Notes
1 Please direct all correspondence to Sabine Zinn, Leibniz
Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi), Data
Center and Method Development, Wilhelmsplatz 3, 96047
Bamberg, Germany; or by E-mail: sabine.zinn@lifbi.de
3 The research was carried out while the authors were at
the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in









Aalen, O. O., Ø. Borgan, and H. K. Gjessing. 2008. Survival
and Event History Analysis. A Process Point of View.
New York: Springer.
Abel, G. J. and N. Sander. 2014. Quantifying global inter-
national migration flows, Science 343(6178): 1520–1522.
Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 50(2): 179–211.
Ajzen, I. and J. Klobas. 2013. Fertility intentions: an
approach based on the theory of planned behavior,
Demographic Research 29: 203–232.
Alfarano, S., T. Lux, and F. Wagner. 2005. Estimation of
agent-based models: the case of an asymmetric
herding model, Computational Economics 26(1): 19–49.
Aparicio Diaz, B., T. Fent, A. Prskawetz, and L. Bernardi.
2011. Transition to parenthood: the role of social inter-
action and endogenous networks, Demography 48(2):
559–579.
Armitage, C. J. andM. Conner. 2001. Efficacy of the theory
of planned behaviour: a meta-analytic review, British
Journal of Social Psychology 40(4): 471–499.
Azose, J. and A. Raftery. 2013. Bayesian probabilistic pro-
jection of international migration rates. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1310.7148.
Baizan, P. and A. González-Ferrer. 2014. What drives
Senegalese migration to Europe? The role of economic
restructuring, labor demand and the multiplier effect of
networks. DemoSoc Working Paper Number 2014–51,
Department of Political and Social Sciences,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Balke, T. and N. Gilbert. 2014. How do agents make
decisions? A survey, Journal of Artificial Societies and
Social Simulation 17(4): 13. Available: http://jasss.soc.
surrey.ac.uk/17/4/13.html.
Beauchemin, C. 2012. Migration between Africa and
Europe: rationale for a survey design. MAFE
Methodological Note 5, Institut National d’Études
Démographiques (INED), Paris. Available: http://www.
ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/21396/note.5_mafe_rationale_
for_a_survey_design.fr.pdf (accessed June 2017).
Beauchemin, C. 2015. Migration between Africa and
Europe (MAFE): looking beyond immigration to under-
stand international migration, Population 70(1): 13–38.
Beine, M., F. Docquier, and Ç. Özden. 2015. Dissecting
network externalities in international migration,
Journal of Demographic Economics 81(04): 379–408.
Beyersmann, J., M. Schumacher, and A. Allignol. 2012.
Competing Risks and Multistate Models with R.
New York: Springer.
Bijak, J. 2011. Forecasting International Migration in
Europe – A Bayesian View. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bijak, J., J. Hilton, E. Silverman, and V. D. Cao. 2013.
Reforging the wedding ring: exploring a semi-artificial
model of population for the United Kingdom with
Gaussian process emulators, Demographic Research 29
(27): 729–766.
Billari, F. 2000. Searching for mates using ‘fast and frugal’
heuristics: a demographic perspective, in G. Ballot and
G. Weisbuch (eds), Applications of Simulation to Social
Sciences. Oxford:Hermes Science Publications, pp. 53–65.
Billari, F. C., A. Prskawetz, B. Aparicio Diaz, and T. Fent.
2007. The ‘Wedding-Ring’: an agent-based marriage
Multistate modelling extended by behaviour S65
model based on social interaction, Demographic
Research 17(3): 59–82.
Bongaarts, J. 2016. Africa’s unique fertility transition,
Population and Development Review, 43(Suppl. 1): 39–
58. doi:10.1111/j.1728–4457.2016.00164.x.
Borjas, G. J. 2014. Immigration Economics. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Chandola, T., D. A. Coleman, and R. W. Hiorns. 1999.
Recent European fertility patterns: fitting curves to
‘distorted’ distributions, Population Studies 53(3):
317–329.
Cirillo, P. and M. Gallegati. 2012. The empirical validation
of an agent-based model, Eastern Economic Journal 38
(4): 525–547.
Clemens, M. 2014. Does development reduce migration? in
R. E. B. Lucas (ed), International Handbook on
Migration and Development. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 152–185.
Coale,A. J. andD.R.McNeil. 1972.Thedistributionbyageof
the frequency of first marriage in a female cohort, Journal
of the American Statistical Association 67: 743–749.
Coulter, R. 2013. Wishful thinking and the abandonment of
moving desires over the life course, Environment and
Planning A, 45: 1944–1962.
Davies, J. B., S. Sandstrom, A. Shorrocks, and E. N. Wolff.
2009. The level and distribution of global household
wealth. Working paper 15508, National Bureau of
Economic Research. Available: www.nber.org/papers/
w15508 (accessed June 2017).
Davies, J. B., S. Sandström, A. Shorrocks, and E. N. Wolff.
2011. The level and distribution of global household
wealth, The Economic Journal 121(551): 223–254.
De Haas, H. 2010. Migration and development: a theoreti-
cal perspective, International Migration Review 44(1):
227–264.
De Jong, G. F. 2000. Expectations, gender, and norms in
migration decision-making, Population Studies 54(3):
307–319.
Epstein, G. S. and I. N. Gang. 2006. The influence of others
on migration plans, Review of Development Economics
10(4): 652–665.
Esipova,N., J. Ray, andA. Pugliese. 2011.Gallupworld poll:
the many faces of migration. Based on research in more
than 150 countries. IOMMigration Research Series No.
43. International Organization for Migration (IOM),
Geneva, in cooperation with GALLUP.
Eurostat. 2016. Table migr_resfirst (first residence permits
in EU28 to Senegalese citizens), data last updated
November 2016. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/data/database?node_code=migr_resfirst
(accessed June 2017).
Faini, R. and A. Venturini. 1993. Trade, aid and migrations:
some basic policy issues, European Economic Review 37
(2–3): 435–442.
Fent, T., B. Aparicio Diaz, and A. Prskawetz. 2013. Family
policies in the context of low fertility and social struc-
ture, Demographic Research 29: 963–998.
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen. 2010. Predicting and Changing
Behaviour. The Reasoned Action Approach.
New York: Psychology Press.
Gilje, E. 1969. Fitting curves to age-specific fertility rates:
some examples, Statistical Review of the Swedish
National Central Bureau of Statistics III 7: 118–134.
Giulietti, C., C. Schluter, and J. Wahba. 2013. With a lot of
help from my friends: social networks and immigration
in the UK, Population, Space and Place 19(6): 657–670.
González-Ferrer, A., P. Baizán, and C. Beauchemin. 2012.
Child-parent separations among Senegalese migrants
to Europe: migration strategies or cultural arrange-
ments? The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 643(1): 106–133.
Grazzini, J. and M. Richiardi. 2015. Estimation of ergodic
agent-based models by simulated minimum distance,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 51: 148–165.
Grow, A., and J. van Bavel. 2015. Assortative mating and
the reversal of gender inequality in education in
Europe: an agent-based model, PLoS ONE 10(6):
e0127806.
Hadwiger, H. 1940. Eine analytische Reprodutions-funk-
tion für biologische Gesamtheiten [An analytical repro-
duction function for biological entities], Skandinavisk
Aktuarietidskrift 23: 101–113.
Hankin, R. K. 2012. Introducing multivator: a multivariate
emulator, Journal of Statistical Software 46(8): 1–20.
Hagen-Zanker, J. 2008. Why do people migrate? A review
of the theoretical literature. Maastricht Graduate
School of Governance Working Paper No. 2008/WP002.
Hatton, T. J. and J. G. Williamson. 2011. Are third world
emigration forces abating? World Development 39(1):
20–32.
Haug, S. 2008. Migration networks and migration decision-
making, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34(4):
585–605.
Heard, D. 2014. Statistical Inference Utilizing Agent Based
Models. Doctoral dissertation, Duke University.
Hilton, J. and J. Bijak. 2017. Design and analysis of demo-
graphic simulations, in A. Grow and J. van Bavel (eds),
Agent-Based Modelling in Population Studies:
Concepts, Methods, and Applications. Basel: Springer
International Publishing, pp. 211–235.
Hugo, G. 2011. Future demographic change and its inter-
actions with migration and climate change, Global
Environmental Change 21: S21–S33.
Ibrahim, R. I. 2008. Expanding an abridged life table
using the Heligman–Pollard Model, Matematika 24(1):
1–10.
Kennedy, M. C. and A. O’Hagan. 2001. Bayesian cali-
bration of computer models, Journal of the Royal
S66 Anna Klabunde et al.
Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology) 63
(3): 425–464.
Keyfitz, N. and H. Caswell. 2005. Applied Mathematical
Demography. 3rd ed. New York: Springer.
Klabunde, A. and F. Willekens. 2016. Decision-making in
agent-based models of migration - state of the art and
challenges, European Journal of Population 32(1):
73–97.
Klabunde, A., F. Willekens, M. Leuchter, and S. Zinn. 2015.
An agent-based decision model of migration, embedded
in the life course - model description in ODD+D format.
MPIDRWorking Paper WP-2015–002.
Kley, S. 2011. Explaining the stages of migration within a
life-course framework, European Sociological Review
27(4): 469–486.
Kley, S. 2017. Facilitators and constraints at each stage of the
migration decision process, Population Studies 71(S1):
S35–S49. doi:10.1080/00324728.2017.1359328.
Kley, S. and C. H. Mulder. 2010. Considering, planning, and
realizing migration in early adulthood. The influence of
life-course events and perceived opportunities on
leaving the city in Germany, Journal of Housing and
the Built Environment 25(1): 73–94.
Kostaki, A. 1991. The Heligman–Pollard formula as a tool
for expanding an Abridged Life Table, Journal of
Official Statistics 7: 311–323.
Mayda, A. M. 2010. International migration: a panel data
analysis of the determinants of bilateral flows, Journal
of Population Economics 23(4): 1249–1274.
Mulder, C. 1993. Migration Dynamics: A Life Course
Approach. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis Publishers.
Munshi, K. 2003. Networks in the modern economy:
Mexican Migrants in the U. S. Labor Market, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 549–599.
Oakley, J. and A. O’Hagan. 2002. Bayesian inference for
the uncertainty distribution of computer model
outputs, Biometrika 89(4): 769–784.
Philipov, D., A. C. Liefbroer, and J. E. Klobas (eds). 2015.
Reproductive Decision-Making in a Macro-Micro
Perspective. Dordrecht: Springer.
Pollard, J. H. 1973.Mathematical Models for the Growth of
Human Populations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Poole, D. and A. E. Raftery. 2000. Inference for determinis-
tic simulation models: the Bayesian melding approach,
Journal of the American Statistical Association 95(452):
1244–1255.
Ravenstein, E. G. 1885. The laws of migration, Journal of
the Statistical Society of London 48(2): 167–235.
Reher, D. S. 2011. Economic and social implications of the
demographic transition, Population and Development
Review 37(s1): 11–33.
Rubinstein, R. and D. Kroese. 2008. Simulation and the
Monte Carlo Method. 2nd ed. New York: Wiley.
Sacks, J., W. I. Welch, T. J. Mitchell, and H. P. Wynn. 1989.
Design and analysis of computer experiments, Statistical
Science 4: 409–423.
Sakho, P., C. Beauchemin, B. Schoumaker, andM. Flahaux.
2013. New patterns of migration between Senegal and
Europe. MAFE Working Paper 21.
Sheppard, Colin J. R. and S. Railsback. 2015. Time
Extension for NetLogo. (Version 1.2) [Software].
Thiele, J. C. and V. Grimm. 2010. NetLogo meets R:
linking agent-based models with a toolbox for their
analysis, Environmental Modelling and Software 25
(8): 972–974.
UnitedNations. 2015.WorldPopulationProspects: The 2015
Revision. New York: United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
Available: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ (accessed June
2017).
VanDalen,H. P., G.Groenewold, and J. J. Schoorl. 2005.Out
ofAfrica: what drives the pressure to emigrate? Journal of
Population Economics 18(4): 741–778.
Warnke, T., O. Reinhardt, A. Klabunde, F. Willekens, and
A. M. Uhrmacher. 2017. Modelling and simulating
decision processes of linked lives - an approach based
on concurrent processes and stochastic race,
Population Studies 71(S1): S69–S83. doi:10.1080/
00324728.2017.1380960.
Westmore, B. 2014. International migration: the relation-
ship with economic and policy factors in the home and
destination country. OECD Economics Department
Working Papers, No. 1140, OECD Publishing.
Wilensky, U. 1999. NetLogo. Available: http://ccl.
northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected
Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University.
Wingens, M., M. Windzio, H. de Valk, and C. Aybed (eds).
2011. A Life-course Perspective on Migration and
Integration. New York: Springer.
Zinn, S. 2012. A mate-matching algorithm for continuous-
time microsimulation models, International Journal of
Microsimulation 5(1): 31–51.
Zinn, S. 2014. Package MicSim. Performing continuous-
time microsimulation. Published on CRAN. Available:
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/MicSim/index.
html (accessed June 2017).
Multistate modelling extended by behaviour S67
